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NOTE
A NEw APPROACH TO SECTION 363(F)(3)
Evan F. Rosen*
Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides five circumstances
in which a debtor may be permitted to sell property free of all
claims and interests, outside of the ordinary course of business, and
prior to plan confirmation. One of those five circumstances is con-
tained in § 363(f)(3), which permits such a sale where the "interest
is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater
than the aggregate value of all liens on such property." While it is
farfrom certain whether § 363(f)(3) requires a price "greater than
the aggregate [face value] of all liens on the property"-the face
value approach-or a price that is "greater than aggregate [eco-
nomic value] of all liens on the property"-the economic value
approach, this Note argues that, properly understood, both ap-
proaches should lead to the same result. More specifically, under
this Note's strict textual approach, the choice between these two
meanings of "value" in § 363(f)(3) is irrelevant; neither interpreta-
tion of § 363(f)(3) permits courts to authorize the sale of property
securing underwater liens-that is, liens whose face value exceeds
the fair market value of the property securing it.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early nineteenth century, American businesses have enjoyed a
unique mechanism for the orderly repair or liquidation of troubled compa-
nies, prescribed by Congress pursuant to its authority to enact "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."' The current Bankruptcy Code was
enacted in 1978 by section 101 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Code"). 2 When a company files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11
of the Code, the debtor' and its stakeholders become entitled to certain pro-
tections under federal law while they formulate a plan to restructure or
liquidate. While this plan is being formulated, the debtor continues to oper-
ate its business relatively freely.' However, the ability of the debtor to
dispose of property outside the ordinary course of its business is limited.'
Generally, the debtor must make such dispositions pursuant to its plan,
which is subject to an array of Code-imposed restrictions intended to protect
the debtor's various constituents. Pursuant to § 363(b) of the Code, how-
ever, the court may authorize the sale of property outside of the ordinary
course of the debtor's business at any point during the bankruptcy process (a
"363(b) Sale").' Such sales are not subject to the various restrictions present
in the plan approval process.! Rather, 363(b) Sales are subject to their own
legislatively and judicially imposed safeguards.'o But these safeguards are
far weaker than their Chapter 11 counterparts.
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended throughout 11 U.S.C.). This is
the fifth bankruptcy statute enacted by Congress, the first of which was passed in 1898 and is some-
times referred to as the Nelson Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (formerly
codified throughout 11 U.S.C.). The Code completely replaced its predecessor, the Chandler Act, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (formerly codified throughout 11 U.S.C.), and has been amended numerous
times, most recently in 2005 through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 1(H)(A), § 204, sec. 1(II)(C), § 231(a), sec. 1(XII),
§ 1221(a), 119 Stat. 49, 72, 195.
3. This Note uses the terms "company" and "debtor" interchangeably.
4. See infra Section I.A for a discussion of the various Chapter II safeguards.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (2006).
6. See id. § 363(b).
7. See, e.g., id. §§ 1121-29.
8. Id. § 363(b).
9. See infra Section I.B for a more detailed description of § 363(b) Sales.
10. See infra Section I.B for a discussion of judicially imposed safeguards. Legislatively
imposed safeguards include the notice and hearing requirements in § 363(b)(1) and the credit bid-
ding provisions in § 363(k) (allowing the purchaser of property to offset creditor claims on that
property against the purchase price). See II U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), (k).
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Generally, when a nonbankrupt debtor sells encumbered property other
than in the ordinary course of business, creditors holding liens on the dis-
posed-of property receive dual liens: the creditors' liens on the property
continue against the purchaser, and the creditors are entitled to a new lien on
the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the debtor." Similarly, when a bank-
rupt debtor sells property outside of the ordinary course of its business in a
363(b) Sale, secured creditors generally continue to be protected by these
two liens.12 As a practical matter, however, the sale of property subject to a
lien dramatically reduces the amount a buyer will pay for the property.
A bankrupt debtor can sell property outside of the ordinary course of its
business in a way that releases liens on the disposed-of property in two ways
(although the lien on the proceeds of the sale may remain intact). 3 The first
is the standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, subject to the various
Chapter 11 safeguards.14 In the second, the court can extinguish all liens on
property sold in a 363(b) Sale-without regard to the Chapter 11 safe-
guards-if the parties satisfy one of the five conditions of § 363(f) (a
"363(f) Sale")." In both cases, a secured creditor's claim on the property
sold is extinguished.6
Section 363(f) provides five circumstances in which a debtor may be
permitted to sell property free of all claims and interests, outside of the or-
dinary course of business, and prior to plan confirmation." Section 363(f)(3)
permits such a sale where the "interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such
property."' 8 There is substantial and legitimate disagreement as to whether
§ 363(f)(3) requires the property to be sold for a price "greater than the
aggregate [face value] of all liens on the property"-the face value ap-
proach-or a price that is "greater than the aggregate [economic value] of
all liens on the property"-the economic value approach.19 However, the two
approaches should produce the same result unless, as some courts adopting
11. Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), for example, "a security interest is
effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against
creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (a) (2000). Similarly, a security interest continues in the proceeds of the
disposed property. Id. § 9-315(a)(2). However, the creditor's claim can only be satisfied once; if the
creditor recovers in full from one lien, the other is extinguished. Id. §§ 9-315 cmt. 2, 9-325.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c).
13. See id. §§ 363(b), (f), I123(a)(5)(D), 1141(c).
14. See id. §§ I123(a)(5)(D), 1141(c); infra Section L.A.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f); accord 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 363.06 (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) ("The Code makes no material change to the cases decided
under the Bankruptcy Act on sales free and clear of liens but clarifies that other grounds for a sale
free and clear may also exist."); infra Section I.C.
16. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), (f), I I23(a)(5)(D), 1141(c).
17. Id. § 363(f); see also infra Section I.C.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
19. See infra Section I.D.
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the economic value approach reasoned, "greater than" means "equal to or
greater than."20
This Note argues that courts interpreting § 363(f)(3) to refer to the eco-
nomic value of the underlying lien incorrectly interpret the phrase "greater
than" to mean "equal to or greater than." Unless and until courts justify that
interpretation, neither the face value approach nor the economic value ap-
proach should be used to permit the sale of property securing a lien where
the lien is underwater." Part I introduces the Chapter 11 plan confirmation
process as the backdrop for 363(f) Sales and explains the courts' dueling
approaches over the proper interpretation of § 363(f)(3). Part II advocates a
third interpretation: the strict textual approach. Under the strict textual ap-
proach, § 363(f)(3) does not permit courts to authorize the sale of property
secured by an underwater lien free of that lien irrespective of whether
"value" is interpreted to mean face value or economic value.
I. INTRODUCTION To BANKRUPTCY
Historically, 363(b) Sales occupied a supporting role in Chapter 11
bankruptcies, allowing a company to dispose of relatively insignificant
property where a delay in disposition would be particularly costly.2 2 Today,
363(b) Sales have evolved to a position of near-equal footing with sales aris-
ing under Chapter 11's standard plan confirmation process.2 As In re
Chrysler demonstrated, a 363(b) Sale can even entirely eclipse the standard
24Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. As 363(b) Sales become more com-
mon, so too will 363(f) Sales, which operate through § 363(b). Because
property not sold in a 363(b) Sale will likely be disposed of in the standard
Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, every 363(b) Sale takes place in the
shadow of the standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. As a result,
understanding Chapter 11, and the protection it provides during the normal
Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, is critical to understanding 363(b)
Sales and 363(f) Sales. Indeed, it is precisely the relative lack of protection
available in 363(f) Sales that distinguishes it from the standard Chapter 11
plan confirmation process.
To that end, Section L.A provides a primer on the standard Chapter II
plan confirmation process for corporate debtors. Section LB then introduces
363(b) Sales (through which 363(f) Sales operate), explains their interaction
with the standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, and contrasts the
comprehensiveness of the mechanisms employed by each to safeguard
20. See infra Section II.A.
21. A lien is underwater where the face value of the lien exceeds the fair market value of the
property securing it.
22. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
24. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (approving a 363(b) Sale
where the property comprised the entire company), aff'd, 576 F3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1015 (2009).
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against abuse. Section I.C introduces § 363(f) and describes the five circum-
stances in which a 363(b) Sale may be accomplished free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and general part-
ners (i.e., a 363(f) Sale). Section I.D then explores the two competing
interpretations of § 363(f)(3) and concludes that a careful analysis of the
plain language, legislative history, and purpose of § 363(f)(3) does not pro-
vide compelling support for either.
A. The Standard Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation Process
Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for companies with viable businesses
that are experiencing temporary difficulties to reorganize and continue to
operate as "going concerns." 25 Rather than force the liquidation of the com-
pany, the Code encourages the parties to formulate a plan of
reorganization.26 Upon filing for bankruptcy, all creditors must stop individ-
ual collection activities against the debtor (the "automatic stay").27 Without
this protection-placing creditors in a figurative waiting room while each
claim is prioritized-the rush of creditors seeking to enforce their claims
before the debtor's money runs out would cause a snowball effect. The
automatic stay thus protects the debtor from its creditors and its creditors
from one another.
The Code permits the appointment of a trustee to represent and manage
the debtor during bankruptcy; but in practice, the debtor generally remains
in possession of the business and undertakes some functions and powers of
the trustee.29 The trustee (or the debtor, exercising the functions and powers
of the trustee) is vested with significant discretion to continue to operate the
debtor's business in the ordinary course, without the approval of the court.30
For example, the trustee can purchase new inventory, borrow money for op-
erations, and hire and fire employees, among other activities. 31 But the
trustee's power to take extraordinary action-action outside of the ordinary
course of business, such as selling a major manufacturing facility-is more
limited; action outside the ordinary course of business generally requires
notice to all interested parties, a hearing, and a finding by the court that the
proposed transaction serves the best interests of the estate and furthers the
25. A "going concern" is a "commercial enterprise actively engaging in business with the
expectation of indefinite continuance." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 760 (9th ed. 2009).
26. For example, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan for the first four months
after filing. II U.S.C. § 1121 (2006).
27. See id. § 362.
28. See id. § 1123.
29. See id. § 1104 (permitting the appointment of a trustee or examiner in certain circum-
stances); id. § 1106 (enumerating the trustee's or examiner's duties); id. § 1107 (granting the debtor
in possession rights similar to those of a trustee); id. § 1108 (authorizing the trustee to operate the
business). This Note uses the term "trustee" to refer to either a trustee appointed pursuant to § 1104
or the debtor performing the trustee's functions pursuant to § 1107.
30. See id. §§ 1106-1108.
31. See id.
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legitimate ends of bankruptcy.3 2 All else being equal, courts generally prefer
simply including in the debtor's plan transactions that are outside of the or-
33dinary course.
For four months, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan of
reorganization to the court.34 The plan classifies and prioritizes creditors'
claims and attempts to satisfy them in an orderly manner." The plan must
group the various claims into classes of similar claims, specify which
classes are impaired," and treat all claims or interests within each class
alike." The debtor's plan must comply with certain requirements dealing
with disclosure," notice,40 and voting,4' and the debtor's plan must satisfy
the best interest of creditors test2 and the absolute priority rule (together,
the "Chapter 11 Safeguards")." After this extensive disclosure and hearing
process the court may permit a sale of property free of all claims and inter-
ests by approving the plan.
As explained in the next section, however, none of these restrictions ap-
ply when assets are sold in a 363(b) Sale. As a result, 363(b) Sales-and to
a much greater extent, 363(f) Sales-may be used "to circumvent the care-
32. Compare id. § 363(c) (sale of assets within the ordinary course), with id. § 363(b) (sale
of assets outside of the ordinary course).
33. See, e.g., Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (subject to certain exceptions).
35. Id. §§ 1122-23.
36. Id. § 1122.
37. Id. § 1124. In general, a class is impaired if its rights are altered by the plan. Id.
38. Id. § 1123(a).
39. Each holder of a claim must be provided with a summary of the plan proposed and a
disclosure statement sufficient to enable "a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an
informed judgment about the plan." Id. § 1125.
40. Notice must be provided before a confirmation hearing is held. Id. § 1128(a).
41. A class of claims has accepted the plan if it is accepted by creditors representing at least
two-thirds of the amount and more than one-half of the number of allowed claims. Id. § 1126(c).
Impaired classes that have not accepted the plan are then subjected to cram-down under § 1129(b),
whereby the court will allocate any remaining value to the senior-most claims first, and then to each
subordinate claim in the order of their priority. Id. § 1129(b). Notwithstanding the operation of
§ 1129(b), if a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one impaired class must accept the
plan. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
42. See id. § 1129(a)(7) (mandating that no class may receive less under the plan, without the
class's consent, than it would if the company was to liquidate).
43. Generally, the debtor cannot cram down an unsecured impaired class under § 1129(b) if a
junior-ranking class of unsecured claims is receiving any value while the rejecting unsecured class
remains impaired. See id. § I l29(b)(2)(B).
44. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.),
700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
45. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(D), 1141(c).
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fully crafted [Chapter 11 Safeguards],"4 and their provisions should be in-
terpreted with that in mind.
B. The Impact of Section 363(b)
With the court's permission, debtors can sell assets outside of the ordi-
nary course of business, prior to plan confirmation, in a 363(b) Sale.
Because 363(b) Sales proceed much more quickly than the normal Chapter
11 plan confirmation process-their very purpose is to expedite transactions
that cannot wait until plan confirmation-and without the Chapter 11 Safe-
guards, the attendant potential for abuse is far greater.48 Historically, that risk
was mitigated to a large extent because 363(b) Sales were confined to the
sale of relatively insubstantial assets, particularly those that were quickly
deteriorating in value; 49 such sales effectively waived many of the Chapter
11 Safeguards where a failure to do so would cause substantial harm to the
debtor (and therefore to the creditors as well).so Today, however, that is no
longer the case." Indeed, as one commentator observed: "[S]ales are now
part of the warp and woof of chapter 11 practice. Of the 10 largest chapter
11 s of 2002, eight used the bankruptcy court as a way of selling their assets
to the highest bidder, whether piecemeal or as a going concern."-"
46. Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MIcH. L. REV. 727,
737 (2010). For example, imagine a powerful creditor with a $1,000 senior lien on an asset worth
$2,000. Since the creditor's claim would be satisfied by a sale price of only $1,000, the creditor
might pressure the debtor to sell the asset as quickly as possible, even if the sale price is less than its
$2,000 fair market value.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
48. Compare the Chapter 11 Safeguards discussed in Section LA, supra, with the protections
described in this Section.
49. Even before reorganizations were introduced, courts authorized such sales in the liquida-
tion context where "the asset was physically perishable, or liable to deteriorate or depreciate in price
and value" as early as 1867. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 BR. 84, 94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (citing Comm.
of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1983)),
aff'd, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009); accord In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841, 842
(2d Cir. 1913) ("[Cloncept of 'perishable' was not limited to its physical meaning, but also included
property liable to deteriorate in price and value."). When reorganizations were finally introduced in
the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (formerly codified throughout 11 U.S.C.), such sales
were permitted where prompt action was required in order to avoid jeopardizing the estate's assets.
See, e.g., In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., 188 F2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that the debtor
must plead and prove "the existence of an emergency involving imminent danger of loss of the
assets"); In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 1949) (concluding that preconfirmation
sales should be "confined to emergencies where there is imminent danger that the assets of the ail-
ing business will be lost if prompt action is not taken").
50. See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1066-68.
51. See, e.g., In re Chrysler, 405 BR. at 96 (approving a 363(b) Sale where the property
comprised the entire company); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight,
56 STAN. L. REv. 673 (2003); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 69, 73 (2004) [hereinafter Baird, The New Face].
52. Baird, The New Face, supra note 51, at 73.
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Court discretion to authorize 363(b) Sales has expanded substantially
over the years.53 When § 363(b) was added to the Code in 1978, it expanded
access to preconfirmation sales outside of the ordinary course of business by
eliminating the requirements that the debtor show cause or make any refer-
ence to an "emergency" or "perishability" requirement at all.54 This change
went largely unnoticed until the Second Circuit's 1983 decision in In re Lio-
nel. The Lionel court permitted a 363(b) Sale even though the asset's value
was not quickly deteriorating-there was no "melting ice cube.""5 Despite
the broad, virtually limitless language of § 363(b), the Lionel court refused
to grant the bankruptcy court "carte blanche," which would undermine the
Code's underlying policy of protecting the interest of creditors and inves-
tors. Rather, Lionel required that the judge find "a good business reason"
before approving a 363(b) Sale. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Conti-
nental Airlines, found that "implicit in § 363(b) is the further requirement of
justifying the proposed transaction."
While some commentators have criticized the 1978 expansion of 363(b)
Sales, arguing that "[b]y relaxing the standard for a [363(b) Sale], the courts
introduced the risk that § 363 could be used to circumvent the carefully
crafted [Chapter 11 Safeguards]," 59 others see 363(b) Sales as too attractive a
business proposition to ignore.6 The latter argue that bankrupt companies,
53. Recently (and famously), the In re Chrysler court approved a 363(b) Sale of the entire
company largely because the debtor established what the court considered "a good business reason."
In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 96 (citing In re Lionel, 722 F2d at 1069 (holding where a favorable
business opportunity is presented and is only available if acted upon quickly, the court has the abil-
ity to authorize the sale if it is in the best interest of the estate)).
54. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069.
55. Id. In re Lionel points to several cases evidencing "the continuing vitality under the old
law of an 'emergency' or 'perishability' standard." Id. at 1068-69 (citing Fin. Assocs. v. Loeffler (In
re Equity Funding Corp. of Am.), 492 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding the trial court's
finding that because the market value of an asset was likely to deteriorate substantially in the near
future, a sale was in the estate's best interests); Int'l Bank of Miami v. Brock (In re Dania Corp.),
400 F.2d 833, 835-37 (5th Cir. 1968) (upholding the sale of stock representing the debtor's major
asset where its value was rapidly deteriorating, causing the reorganizing estate to diminish); and
Marathon Foundry & Machine Co. v. Schwartz (In re Marathon Foundry & Machine Co.), 228 F.2d
594 (7th Cir. 1955) (heavy interest charges justified the sale of stock that had been pledged to secure
a loan)); accord In re Pedlow, 209 F. 841, 842 (2d Cir. 1913) (finding that the concept of perishabil-
ity included "property liable to deteriorate in price and value").
56. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069.
57. Id. at 1069-71 (reviewing the plain language and the legislative history). For the relevant
factors in finding a "reasonable business purpose" articulated by the Lionel court, see infra note 73
and accompanying text.
58. Institutional Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Air
Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986).
59. Roe & Skeel, supra note 46, at 737.
60. See, e.g., James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH L. REv. 691 (2008) (arguing that
363(b) Sales do provide better returns than those that are likely to be had in Chapter 11 by a full
reorganization). But see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH
L. REv. 1, 24-27 (2007) (arguing that the bankrupt debtor realizes lower sales prices on its assets in
a 363(b) Sale relative to the payoff to be had in Chapter 11 by a full reorganization). See generally
Roe & Skeel, supra note 46, at 735 (acknowledging the opposing arguments regarding the extent to
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which tend to come from declining industries, should consolidate, and "[i]f
a few terms have to be handled in the § 363 sale that would ordinarily be
handled under [the normal Chapter 11 plan confirmation process], then
courts, and bankruptcy doctrine, should find a way to accommodate the
quick sale, but without scuttling the entire [structure of Chapter 11 Safe-
guards] .
While courts today agree that a debtor should not be permitted to use a
62
363(b) Sale to strategically avoid Chapter 11 Safeguards, they disagree on
the contours of this prohibition. On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit imports
the absolute priority rule-one of the Chapter 11 Safeguards-into the
363(b) Sale context. 4 The rule provides that "the holder of any claim or in-
terest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain
under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property."5
The Fifth Circuit also prohibits sub rosa plans: 363(b) Sales that make prior-
ity and voting determinations that would normally be addressed during the
standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process.66 A sale that "allow[s] [the]
debtor to gut the bankruptcy estate before reorganization or to change the
fundamental nature of the estate's assets in such a way that limits a future
reorganization plan" would be off-limits.o
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has adopted a more flexible ap-
proach, allowing a case-by-case determination based on the relevant facts
68
and circumstances. While acknowledging that whether a settlement is "fair
and equitable"6 is important and often dispositive, the court has refused to
adopt the Fifth Circuit's bright line rules.o Instead, the Second Circuit
which 363(b) Sales are more profitable than the returns sellers realize through Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations).
61. Roe & Skeel, supra note 46, at 735-36.
62. See, e.g., In re Cont'l Air Lines, 780 F.2d at 1228 ("[I1f a debtor were allowed to reorgan-
ize ... in some fundamental fashion [in a 363(b) Sale], creditor's [Chapter 11] rights ... might
become meaningless."); In re Terrace Gardens Park P'ship, 96 B.R. 707, 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989) ("[A] debtor should not be permitted to use [a 363(b) Sale] to 'cash out' a creditor, depriving
the creditor of its [Chapter 11 Safeguards].").
63. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways,
Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. See, e.g., United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("[A] bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in approving a [preplan] settlement with a
junior creditor unless the court concludes that priority of payment will be respected as to objecting
senior creditors.").
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
66. See, e.g., In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 940 (striking down a proposed sale where
"little would remain save fixed based equipment and little prospect or occasion for further reorgani-
zation," because the court viewed the plan as a de facto reorganization).
67. Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & Wilcox Co.), 250
F.3d 955, 960 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing In re BraniffAirways, 700 F.2d at 940).
68. See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating
LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007).
69. The fair and equitable standard is derived from the § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) cram-down provi-
sions applicable under a normal Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. Id. at 462.
70. See id. at 464-65.
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allows courts to "endorse a settlement that does not comply in some minor
respects with the priority rule if the parties to the settlement justify, and the
reviewing court clearly articulates the reasons for approving, a settlement
that deviates from the priority rule."" To that end, the "size of the transac-
tion, and the residuum of corporate assets, is . . . just one consideration for
the exercise of discretion, along with an open-ended list of other salient fac-
tors."7 2 The Second Circuit has suggested an open-ended list of salient
factors:
[T]he proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole, the amount
of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization
will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the pro-
posed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be
obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property,
which of the alternatives of use, sale or lease the proposal envisions and,
most importantly perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in
value.73
Because every case will present some of these factors, such a nondispositive
list of factors gives Second Circuit courts far more discretion than their Fifth
Circuit counterparts.
While the standards for allowing 363(b) Sales are in flux, increased ac-
ceptance of 363(b) Sales puts tremendous pressure on § 363(f). If 363(b)
Sales cannot be made free of liens, many such sales will not be possible-an
unfortunate result given their attractiveness as a business matter. While both
approaches to 363(b) Sales clearly recognize the potential for abuse, the
safeguards established by the Second Circuit, and to a lesser extent by the
Fifth Circuit, do not provide the same level of protection to secured credi-
tors as do the Chapter 11 Safeguards.
C. Protection in Section 363(f)
Outside of the standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process,7 4 a debtor
may be permitted to sell property outside of the ordinary course of business
free of all claims and interests only by satisfying one of the five conditions
of § 363(f) (i.e., in a 363(f) Sale)." However, unlike sales pursuant to the
standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, 363(f) Sales occur without
71. Id. at 464-65.
72. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir.), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
73. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071
(2d Cir. 1983).
74. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(D), 1141(c) (2006); supra Section I.A.
75. Section 363(f) simply codifies existing common law principles permitting courts to
authorize the sale of property outside of the ordinary course, free and clear of any interest, prior to
the standard Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15,
1 363.06 ("The Code makes no material change to the cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act on
sales free and clear of liens but clarifies that other grounds for a sale free and clear may also exist.").
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the benefit of the Chapter 11 Safeguards-the disclosure, notice, voting, and
76priority safeguards discussed in Section L.A-to protect secured creditors.
The five conditions of § 363(f) are:
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest;
(2) [the creditor] consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold
is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to
accept a money satisfaction of such interest."
Section 363(f)(1) ensures that an otherwise legal and equitable sale is not
held up due to technicalities arising out of bankruptcy law by allowing a
sale free of all interest where applicable nonbankruptcy law permits such a
sale." Section 363(f)(2) ensures that a sale will not be impeded where all
parties with an interest in the relevant asset have consented, recognizing the
possibility that the creditor may want to surrender the protection otherwise
afforded by the Code.7 9 Section 363(f)(4) "can be used as an expeditious
method to clear title to a disputed asset" by allowing "productive assets sub-
ject to deadlocking disputes" to be placed with a third party and utilized
while the original parties resolve their dispute.o Section 363(f)(5) permits a
sale where the creditor could be compelled to accept a payment in exchange
for its interest in a hypothetical nonbankruptcy proceeding that is "broadly
accepted."'
Each of these provisions describes a narrow circumstance in which
Congress has determined that the importance of maintaining the creditor's
lien on the disposed-of property is outweighed by some other factor.82
76. See supra Section I.A.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
78. See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undernin-
ing the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 244 (2002).
79. See id. at 245.
80. Id. at 247-48. For a more detailed discussion of § 363(f)(4), see id. at 249-51 (identify-
ing points of contention in the interpretation of § 363(f)(4), which are outside the scope of this
Note).
81. Id. at 251-52. A broadly accepted nonbankruptcy proceeding includes one where a lien-
holder can be forced to accept a monetary satisfaction through the process of foreclosure. See id.
There are several problems with the clause's phrasing, particularly the possibility that a plain read-
ing of § 363(f)(5) would swallow the other four provisions, which are outside the scope of this Note.
For a more detailed discussion of § 363(f)(5), see generally id. at 251-57.
82. Id. at 245 ("[L]iens exist to secure payment; if the payment is made, there is no need for
the liens.").
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D. Evaluating the Face Value Approach and the
Economic Value Approach
Section 363(f)(3) permits a 363(f) Sale where the "price at which
such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens
on such property."" There is substantial and legitimate disagreement as
to whether § 363(f)(3) requires the property to be sold for a price
"greater than the aggregate [face value] of all liens on the property" (the
face value approach) or a price that is "greater than the aggregate [eco-
nomic value] of all liens on the property" (the economic value
approach).' The one bankruptcy appellate panel that directly addressed
the issue adopted the face value approach;" other courts continue to fall
83. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2006).
84. If a lien with a face value of $100 were secured by property that is worth $90, the face
value of the lien would be $100, while the economic value would be $90. For a more detailed illus-
tration of the two approaches, see infra Figure 1 and accompanying text. For one of the leading
cases adopting the face value approach, see Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW,
LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 40-41 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). See also Criimi Mae Servs., Ltd. P'ship v. WDH
Howell, LLC (In re WDH Howell, LLC), 298 B.R. 527, 534 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003) (holding that the
debtor in possession cannot sell the collateral free and clear of all liens under § 363(f)(3) "unless the
sale price is greater than the aggregate face value of all liens on the property"); In re LLC Financial
Corp., No. 02-12846-MWV, 2002 WL 33894816, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 10, 2002) (agreeing
with In re Perroncello); In re Perroncello, 170 B.R. 189, 191-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (following
Scherer); Scherer v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n (In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, Ltd.,) 159 BR. 821,
827-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (refusing to follow In re Beker); In re Gen. Bearing Corp., 136 B.R.
361, 366-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1992) (noting that the debtor failed to produce evidence that the sale
price was greater than the aggregate value of all the liens on the collateral); Richardson v. Pitt Cnty.
(In re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), 47 B.R. 999, 1001-02 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding statutory
"aggregate value of all liens" means the full amount of all debt secured by the liens, and noting the
alternative would violate "the well-established rule that the bankruptcy court should not order the
sale of property free and clear of interests and liens unless the court is satisfied that the sale pro-
ceeds will fully compensate the secured lienholders and produce some equity for the estate"), aff'd,
983 F2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1986). For the leading case adopting the economic value approach, see In re
Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. 474, 475-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986) (statutory "aggregate value of all
liens" means the actual economic value of the lien). See also In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 450
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); WBQ P'ship v. Va. Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ P'ship),
189 BR. 97, 105-06 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Long Point Road Ltd. P'ship, No. 93-72769-W,
1996 WL 33340783, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 5, 1996); Milford Grp., Inc. v. Concrete Step Units,
Inc. (In re Milford Grp., Inc.), 150 13.R. 904,906 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992); In re WPRV-TV, Inc., 143
B.R. 315, 320 (D.P.R. 1991), vacated, 165 B.R. I (D.P.R. 1992), modified, 983 E2d 336 (1st Cir.
1993); In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 356-57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Terrace
Gardens Park P'ship, 96 B.R. 707, 712-13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
85. Knupfer, 391 B.R. at 41 ("[Section] 363(f)(3) does not authorize the sale free and clear
of a lienholder's interest if the price of the estate property is equal to or less than the aggregate
amount of all claims held by creditors who hold a lien or security interest in the property being
sold."). The Seventh Circuit has signaled a principled preference for the face value approach as well,
albeit in a different context and only in dicta: "As a general rule, the bankruptcy court should not
order property sold 'free and clear of' liens unless the court is satisfied that the sale proceeds will
fully compensate secured lienholders and produce some equity for the benefit of the bankrupt's
estate." In re Riverside Inv. P'ship, 674 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis omitted) (citing
Freeman Furniture Factories, Inc. v. Bowlds (In re Ames Corp.), 136 F.2d 136, 140 (6th Cir. 1943);
Hoehn v. McIntosh, 110 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1940); In re Unikraft Homes of Va., Inc., 370 F.
Supp. 667, 670-71 (W.D. Va. 1974); and In re Bernhard Altmann Int'l Corp., 226 F Supp. 201,
205-06 (S.D.N.Y 1963)). On the other hand, in affirming Richardson, 47 B.R. 999, the Fourth
Circuit indicated a possible preference for the economic value approach: "While we do not neces-
sarily agree with all that was said in the opinion of the district court in [adopting the face value
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on either side. A careful analysis of the plain language, legislative history,
and purpose of § 363(f)(3) does not provide compelling support for either
the face value approach or the economic value approach.
The word "value" has no plain meaning as applied to a lien. On the one
hand, the reference to the "value," rather than to the "amount," of the lien
argues in favor of the economic value approach. However, when Congress
intends to denote the concept of economic value in the Code, it usually re-
fers to the value of "claims" rather than to the value of "liens."" This raises
a question as to whether the reference to "value" in § 363(f)(3) is "simply an
unfortunate deviation from the Code's general preference to refer to claims,
and not liens, or whether it has some other significance."" Perhaps using a
word other than "claims"-a term used exhaustively throughout the Code to
refer to economic value concepts, and one of which Congress has intimate
knowledge89-reflects Congress's intent to refer to something other than
economic value. As discussed below, the economic value of a lien is not an
obvious concept.o Still, if Congress meant to say "amount of the lien," it
could have done so. Thus, consideration of the plain language does not end
the inquiry.
When construing statutory language, consideration should be given to
the way similar terms are used in other areas of the Code.9' Advocates of the
economic value approach ascribe a meaning to the word "value" consistent
92
with its use in § 506(a), a section that uses "value" for other related
approach], we think that the district court reached a correct, proper and equitable result." Richardson
v. Pitt Cnty. (In re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), No. 85-1422, 1986 WL 181749, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 21,
1986).
86. See supra note 84.
87. See Knupfer, 391 B.R. at 40 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 506(a), 1129(a)(7)(B)).
88. Id. at 39. This raises the question of whether "the unusual construction should be given
special interpretive significance." Id. at 38.
89. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, 1129(b)(2) (addressing the filing of proofs of claims or
interest, allowance of claims or interests, and the requirements necessary for a plan to be considered
fair and equitable with respect to a class).
90. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
91. See Knupfer, 391 BR. at 38 ("[T]he Supreme Court has acknowledged that even unde-
fined words and phrases in the Bankruptcy Code should presumptively receive the same
construction, even if found in different parts of the code." (citing Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320,
326-27 (2005) (determining the definition of the Bankruptcy Code phrase "on account of' by refer-
ring to other instances of that phrase in the Code)); Davis v. Mich. Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S.
803, 809 (1989) ("[Sltatutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon
of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme."); Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2005) ("Our goal in interpreting a statute is to understand the statute 'as a symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme' and to 'fit, if possible, all parts into a ... harmonious whole.'") (quot-
ing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)); In re Beker Indus.
Corp., 63 B.R. 474, 475 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
92. See, e.g., In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447,450-51 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); Milford Grp., Inc.
v. Concrete Step Units, Inc. (In re Milford Grp., Inc.), 150 B.R. 904, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992); In
re WPRV-TV, 143 B.R. 315, 320 (D.P.R. 1991), vacated, 165 B.R. 1 (D.P.R. 1992), modified, 983
F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 356-57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1990); In re Terrace Gardens Park P'ship, 96 B.R. 707, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Beker
Indus., 63 B.R. at 475.
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purposes. They point out that the amount of an allowed secured claim pur-
suant to § 506(a) generally cannot exceed the value of the property securing
the claim, and that a secured claim is a form of a lien.9 Applying the well-
settled rule of statutory interpretation noscitur a sociis95-Latin for "it is
known from its associates"-some courts conclude the term "value" em-
ployed in § 363(f)(3) should be similarly interpreted. The Supreme Court
has employed a similar analysis in the past to hold that the phrase "value of
such entity's interest" in § 361(1) and (2), when applied to secured creditors,
should mean the same as the phrase "value of such creditor's interest" in
§ 506(a).17 The Supreme Court could do the same to the expression "value
of all liens on the property" in § 363(f)(3).9 '
However, these two provisions exist in very different contexts, casting
some doubt on that proposition. First, § 506(a) makes determinations as part
of the normal Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, subject to the Chapter
11 Safeguards. On the other hand, § 363(f)(3) allows debtors to circumvent
the normal Chapter 11 plan confirmation process-and the Chapter 11 Safe-
guards-to do what they ordinarily may not.99 Second, § 506(a) deals with
the value of property, while § 363(f)(3) deals with the value of a lien, a
much more amorphous concept. Indeed, the economic value of a lien is not
at all obvious. Courts seem to almost universally equate the economic value
of a lien with the fair market value of the property securing the lien,se and
the remainder of this Note accepts that interpretation. However, the term
could just as easily refer to the excess of (i) the lesser of (a) the face value of
the lien and (b) the fair market value of the property securing the lien, over
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property
... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property.").
94. Knupfer, 391 B.R. at 39-40. However, this "statement would not be true if a creditor
could and did make the § 1111(b) election to have its allowed secured claim equal its total claim
amount, 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b), or, in a chapter 13 case, if the hanging paragraph of § 1325 applied, 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)." Id. at 39 n.14.
95. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) ("The maxim noscitur a sociis,
that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied
where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the
Acts of Congress.").
96. See In re Beker Indus., 63 B.R. at 475; In re Collins, 180 B.R. at 450-01; In re Milford
Grp., 150 B.R. at 906; In re WPRV-TV, 143 B.R. at 319-21; In re Oneida Lake Dev., 114 B.R. at
356-57; In re Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R. at 712-13.
97. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988).
98. In re Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R. at 713.
99. This assumes that in the absence of § 363(f), courts would generally not exercise their
equitable powers pursuant § 105 to extinguish liens in 363(b) Sales.
100. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 40
(B.A.P 9th Cir. 2008) (applying this definition in the face value approach context); In re Beker
Indus., 63 B.R. at 476 (applying this definition in the economic value approach context).
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(ii) the value of the claim on an unsecured basis-this is the value added by
the lien.0'o
The legislative history, however, refers to the "amount," not the "value,"
secured by the lien.'0 While acknowledging these statements, some courts
argue that Congress was not focusing on this particular distinction when
making these comments. 'o Instead, these courts point to statements in a
Senate Report speaking more broadly about the purpose of the Code, which
emphasizes that it is "the value of the collateral" that deserves protection.'
However, the statements emphasizing that it is "the value of the collateral"
that deserves protection were made with respect to Code sections that are
subject to the Chapter 11 Safeguards and are therefore not analogous with
those-like § 363(f)(3)-that are not.'05
II. SECTION 363(F)(3) DOES NOT APPLY TO UNDERWATER LIENS
Section § 363(f)(3) permits the sale of property securing a lien free of
that lien if the price at which such property is sold is "greater than the ag-
gregate value of all liens on such property."'0 Section II.A explains that the
uncertainty as to whether § 363(f)(3) refers to the economic value or the
face value of the lien is actually irrelevant, since courts adopting the face
value approach should reach the same practical result as those adopting the
economic value approach.' Section II.B argues that the reason some courts
101. For example, assume Debtor owns property with a fair market value of $90, Creditor has
a $100 lien on the property, and Debtor will eventually pay out 75 cents for each dollar of unsecured
claim. In the absence of that lien, Creditor would be entitled to $75. In one sense, the economic
value of Creditor's lien is $90, because Creditor's secured position entitles him to $90. In another
sense, the value added by Creditor's lien is only $15, because Creditor would have been entitled to
$75 of that $90 even without the lien. While this latter interpretation of the economic value of a lien
seems perfectly rational when considered in a vacuum, it makes no sense at all in the context of
§ 363(f)(3). First, it requires an ex post determination of the payout to unsecured creditors, and
second, requiring the property be worth $15 in order for Creditor to invoke § 363(f)(3) has no rela-
tionship to any apparent purpose of § 363(f)(3).
102. "The trustee may sell free and clear ... [when] the interest is a lien and the sale price of
the property is greater than the amount secured by the lien. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 345 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6302; accord S. REP. No. 95-989, at 56 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5842.
103. E.g., In re Beker Indus., 63 B.R. at 476 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 345 and S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 54).
104. E.g., id. at 476 (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54). COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY notes:
House and Senate Reports, which described an earlier version of the section that referred to the
"amount" rather than the "value" of the liens, state that "[tihe trustee may sell free and clear if
... the sales price of the property is greater than the amount secured by the lien."
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, 1 363.06[4] (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 345 and S. REP. No. 95-989, at 56).
105. See In re Beker Indus., 63 B.R. at 476 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54 (discussing the
adequate protection afforded a secured creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 361)).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2006).
107. See supra Section I.D.
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think the choice between the face value approach and the economic value
approach provides different results is because those adopting the economic
value approach also interpret "greater than" to mean "equal to or greater
than" (the modified economic value approach). 08 In doing so, courts rewrite
§ 363(f)(3), substituting their own judgment for the explicit boundaries es-
tablished by Congress without support in the plain language of the statute,
the legislative history, or the context of the provision.
A. The Strict Textual Approach: Face Value and Economic Value
Produce the Same Result
As a practical matter, both the face value approach and the economic
value approach produce the same result. The unambiguous language in
§ 363(f)(3) requires the property to be sold for an amount "greater than" the
value-whether the face value or the economic value-of the lien.'" As a
result, the difference between the two interpretations is insignificant. Figure
1 helps make this proposition clear.
FIGURE 1
Face Value of Sale Price of Section 363(f)(3) Availability of
Lien Underlying Asset "Value" of Lien § 363(f)(3)
Face Value $100 $110 $100 Yes
Approach $100 $90 $100 No
Economic Value $100 $110 $100 Yes
Approach $100 $90 $90 No
The face value of a lien is easy enough to detennine; it is simply the
amount of the lien. The economic value of a lien is the lesser of the face
value of the lien and the economic value of the property securing the lien."o
The economic value of the property securing the lien is equal to what "a
seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay"'"-in other words,
the sale price of that property.12 It is the lesser of the two because the
amount a lienholder stands to recover can fall below the lien's face value but
cannot rise above it; the lienholder will never stand to recover more than the
face value of the lien. In Figure 1, the face value of the lien is $100 and the
108. See, e.g., In re Beker Indus., 63 B.R. at 476 ("We thus conclude that § 363(f)(3) is to be
interpreted to mean what it says: the price must be equal to or greater than the aggregate value of the
liens asserted against it, not their amount.").
109. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
110. Cf supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111. BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1587.
112. But see In re Terrace Gardens Park P'ship, 96 B.R. 707, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(holding that the debtor's property was sold for more than its economic value). This finding directly
contradicts the meaning of economic value and is therefore (hopefully) an anomaly. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1587.
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sale price of the property securing the lien is either $90 (meaning the lien is
underwater) or $110 (meaning the lien is above water).
Applying the face value approach, the property supporting the above-
water lien could be sold if its sale price is $110, because that sale price
would be "greater than" the $100 face value of the lien. However, the prop-
erty supporting the underwater lien could not be sold, because its $90 sale
price would be less than, not "greater than," the $100 face value of the lien.
Thus, § 363(f)(3) provides no relief for property securing an underwater
lien, because such property cannot be sold for an amount "greater than the
[face value] of [the lien]. 113
Applying the economic value approach, the property supporting the
above-water lien could be sold if its sale price is $110, because the sale price
would be "greater than" the $100 economic value of the lien. However, the
property supporting the underwater lien could not be sold, because its $90
sale price would be equal to, not "greater than," the $90 economic value of
the lien. Like the face value approach, the economic value approach pro-
vides no relief for the sale of property securing an underwater lien, because
such property cannot be sold for an amount "greater than the [economic
value] of [the lien]."'4 Therefore, neither approach permits the sale of prop-
erty subject to an underwater lien and both approaches permit the sale of
property subject to a lien that is not underwater.' 15
B. "Greater than" Is Unambiguous
The choice between the face value approach and the economic value ap-
proach matters only because courts adopting the economic value approach
have erroneously, and without any rational explanation, interpreted "greater
than" to mean "equal to or greater than.""'6 When courts adopt that interpre-
tation, the choice between the face value approach and the economic value
approach takes on new significance. This seemingly radical interpretation of
unambiguous language is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and
113. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
114. Id. This Note assumes that any possible sale would be completed on an arms-length
basis.
115. It is worth noting, however, that all three approaches prohibit the sale of property secur-
ing a lien when the sale price of the property equals the face value of the lien. This is a strange
result. Perhaps this was intended to provide an extra element of protection for the secured creditor-
a "tie" goes to the secured creditor, if you will-in this unusual context. See supra note 99 and infra
note 141 and the accompanying text for a discussion of this unusual circumstance. But see Adam J.
Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime,
80 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 14 (2006) (observing that, in general, the benefit of the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the debtor).
116. See, e.g., In re Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. 474, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("We thus
conclude that § 363(f)(3) is to be interpreted to mean what it says: the price must be equal to or
greater than the aggregate value of the liens asserted against it, not their amount."). Another court,
ignoring the generally accepted definition of economic value, held that the property at issue was
actually being sold for more than its economic value. See In re Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R at 713.
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the statute's legislative history,"' ignores the context of § 363(f)(3),"' and
expands the reach of the statute to provide courts with carte blanche to ex-
tinguish a creditor's lien merely because the court thinks it is a good idea.
On the one hand, the face value approach's analysis remains the same
using the "equal to or greater than" interpretation: § 363(f)(3) is inapplica-
ble to sales of property securing underwater liens and permits sales of
property securing above-water liens. Applying the facts from Figure 1, the
property supporting the above-water lien could be sold because its $110 sale
price would be "equal to or greater than" the $100 face value of the lien.
However, the property supporting the underwater lien could not be sold be-
cause its $90 sale price would be less than, not "equal to or greater than,"
the $100 face value of the lien. Thus, § 363(f)(3) provides no relief for
property securing an underwater lien, because such property cannot be sold
for an amount "[equal to or] greater than the [face value] of [the lien].""'
The economic value approach, on the other hand, becomes all encom-
passing, because (i) the sale price of property securing an above-water lien
is generally greater than the economic value of the lien, and (ii) the sale
price of property securing an underwater lien is generally equal to the eco-
nomic value of the lien. Using the facts from Figure 1, the property
supporting the above-water lien could be sold because its $110 sale price
would be "equal to or greater than" the $100 economic value of the lien.
Likewise, the property supporting the underwater lien could be sold because
its $90 sale price would be "equal to or greater than" the $90 economic val-
ue of the lien. Thus, when the economic value approach is used in concert
with the "equal to or greater than" interpretation, virtually every sale of
property will meet the condition in § 363(f)(3): the sale price will almost
certainly be for an amount "equal to [where the lien is underwater] or great-
er than [where the lien is not underwater]" the economic value of the lien on
the property.
The phrase "greater than" is plain on its face and not at all ambiguous.
In order to interpret a statute to mean something other than what it seems to
say-here, that the property must be sold for "greater than" the value of the
lien-there must be some ambiguity in the provision as written. 20 Courts
interpreting "greater than" to mean "equal to or greater than" fail to "give
effect to the express language of the statute."'2' Where Congress intends to
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2006).
120. The general rule of statutory interpretation is that the "legislature says in a statute what it
means." Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). "When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'" Id. (quoting
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
121. In re Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R. at 713 (acknowledging that its approach fails to "give
effect to the express language of the statute, which calls for the price to exceed the aggregate value
of all liens on the property" before adopting the economic value approach (emphasis omitted)).
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say "equal to or greater than," it does so explicitly.122 For example, § 363(b)
clearly represents a grant to the courts of wide discretion to consider "the
facts, circumstances and conditions" in deciding whether to permit a sale of
property not subject to a lien outside of the ordinary course. Like § 363(f),
§ 363(b)(2)(B) is not subject to the Chapter 11 Safeguards. In fact,
§ 363(b)(2)(B) is a provision through which § 363(f)(3) directly operates,
governing the underlying sale in which § 363(f) would be employed to re-
lease liens and encumbrances.2 3
Lack of ambiguity notwithstanding, the leading case that applies the eco-
nomic value approach, In re Beker, inexplicably concluded that "§ 363(f)(3) is
to be interpreted to mean what it says: the price must be equal to or greater
than the aggregate value of the liens asserted against it, not their amount" in
order to permit the sale of property securing an underwater lien.14 The state-
ment is self-defeating: it argues against an interpretation of "value" to mean
"face value" because it directly conflicts with the plain language of the stat-
ute, and then it substitutes "equal to or greater than" for the statute's plain
language.25 Ironically, the In re Beker court went on to say in the next para-
graph that "[b]road statements to the contrary, made without any analysis
... are no reason for not following the language of the statute." 26 Adopting
a slightly more nuanced-although substantially more erroneous-analysis,
In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership justified its use of the economic
value approach by holding that the property at issue was actually being sold
for more than its economic value.127 In re Terrace Gardens Park Partner-
ship's holding directly contradicts the widely accepted meaning of
economic value; you cannot sell property for more than what a third party
buyer is willing to pay.1
Because virtually every sale of property will be for an amount "equal to
or greater than" what "a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to
pay" (i.e., the economic value of the lien), 129 courts adopting the "equal to or
greater than" language effectively interpret § 363(f)(3) to provide carte
blanche to extinguish a creditor's lien merely because the court thinks it is a
good idea.1 30 For example, In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership conjured
122. See, for example, II U.S.C. § 129(a)(7)(A)(ii), (a)(7)(B), (a)(15)(A), illustrating Con-
gress's familiarity with "not less than." See, for example, id. § 1129(a)(10), (b)(2)(A)(II), illustrating
Congress's familiarity with "at least."
123. Section 363(f) states: "The trustee may sell property under [§ 363(b) or (c)] free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate ..... Id. § 363(f).
124. In re Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. 474, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986).
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. 96 B.R 710, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
128. See, e.g., BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1587. Again, this assumes the
sale is at arms-length, and not the subject of any collusion between the parties to the sale.
129. See id. But see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 451 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that when the
price is equal to the aggregate value of the liens, "[case law indicates that courts must address these
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up the authority to permit a 363(f) Sale "after examination of the surround-
ing circumstances and a finding by the court that those circumstances
justiflied] the sale." '3 In re Collins wrote the entire provision out of the
Code, holding that when the price is equal to the aggregate value of the
liens, "courts must address these types of sales on a case by case basis, and
give judicial consent only after the surrounding circumstances are carefully
scrutinized and a determination is made that the sale is justified."132 Simi-
larly, In re WBQ Partnership held "the best price obtainable under the
circumstances" to be sufficient. 133
Such broad interpretations are inconsistent with the limited scope of
§ 363(f).'3 Section 363(b), through which § 363(f) operates, is already sub-
ject to the court's discretion.135 If Congress intended to subject § 363(f) only
to that same limitation, there would be no need to include five specific cir-
cumstances where § 363(f) should apply. Thus, if § 363(f)(3) were
interpreted to give the courts carte blanche, it would not only write the other
four provisions of § 363(f) out of the Code, it would write itself out of the
Code.16
Properly understood, each provision of § 363(f) addresses a narrow and
targeted circumstance in which the court may extinguish a lien prior to
Chapter 11 plan confirmation. Section 363(f)(3) describes a narrow circum-
stance in which debtors may do what they ordinarily may not-sell property
free of liens, prior to plan confirmation, and without the Chapter 11 Safe-
guards-when the lien no longer serves a purpose, and the creditor is no
worse off without it.' When the underlying property is being sold for a
price that allows the creditor to be fully repaid, restricting the creditor's lien
to the proceeds of the property sale, as opposed to the proceeds of the prop-
erty sale and the property itself, should be of no moment-the creditor is
fully repaid and should be indifferent to whether the sale occurs. In contrast,
the modified economic value approach offers absolutely no protection to the
creditor at all; a court could permit a sale of property, free of all liens, even
to the great prejudice of the creditor. While it may be possible-maybe even
likely-that courts are able to protect secured creditors' rights without the
types of sales on a case by case basis, and give judicial consent only after the surrounding circum-
stances are carefully scrutinized and a determination is made that the sale is justified"); see also
WBQ P'ship v. Va. Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 B.R. 97, 105 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1995) ("[Wlhen the purchase price equals the value of the liened property, the sale is still
permissible under § 363(f)(3) if the proposed price is the best obtainable under the circumstances,
and if there are 'special circumstances justifying the sale for less than the amount of the liens.'"
(quoting In re Collins, 180 B.R. at 451)).
131. 96 B.R at 713.
132. In re Collins, 180 B.R. at 451.
133. In re WBQ P'ship, 189 B.R. at 105.
134. See supra Section I.C.
135. See supra Section I.B.
136. See supra Section I.C.
137. See supra Section I.C for an overview of the provisions of § 363(f).
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Chapter 11 Safeguards in 363(b) Sales, 3 1 Congress clearly did not give them
this power. By effectively limiting application of § 363(f)(3) to the sale of
property securing a lien only when the lien is not underwater,'" Congress
confined § 363(f)(3) to instances in which the creditor is demonstrably no
worse off as a result of the sale.
Many courts adopting the modified economic value approach do so in
part because they believe it better serves the underlying purpose of the
Code. For example, In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership argued that "[i]t
makes no sense to read into Section 363(f)(3) a restriction inconsistent"
with the Code's "focus on protecting the value of collateral" just because the
sale is free of liens.'4 However, this statement reflects a mistaken view of
§ 363(f) generally and of § 363(f)(3) specifically. First, the "restriction" is
not a restriction at all; § 363(f) expands, rather than restricts, what the deb-
tor can do. 14 The status quo is the standard plan confirmation, and
§ 363(f)(3) is properly viewed as an expansion of those rights in a narrow
set of circumstances. Second, the "restriction" is not being "read into Sec-
tion 363(f)(3)"-it is expressly stated. 14 Third, that the "sale is free of liens"
is a perfectly legitimate reason for restricting this exception to the status
quo. A sale free of all liens strips the secured creditor of an important right,
and, where the lien continues to serve a purpose, imposing restrictions on
when the court can use this extraordinary power to release the lien seems
perfectly reasonable. One court's concern that "an undersecured creditor
[could] obstinately block an otherwise sensible sale" 43 is correct but misses
the point: Congress made the judgment to enact that rule. Where Congress
has clearly chosen strict parameters instead of granting judicial discretion,
courts should abide by the instructions they have been given.
138. The Fifth Circuit instructs courts to examine the manner in which a proposed sale might
deprive objecting parties of their rights and attempt to fashion appropriate protections. Institutional
Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d
1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1986).
139. Applying the face value approach, a debtor with property encumbered by a $100 lien
would have to sell the property for $ 101 -even if the property is only worth one penny-in order to
qualify under § 363(f)(3). The economic value approach reaches the same result, since the economic
value of a $100 lien on property worth up to $100 will be equal to, not greater than, the economic
value of the property.
140. 96 B.R. 707, 712-13 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). By permitting an undersecured creditor to
protect itself from an inadequately priced 363(f) Sale by bidding its own claim, § 363(k), the eco-
nomic value approach is more consistent with the Code's adequate protection scheme. See In re
Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R. at 712-14; BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
141. Again, this assumes that in the absence of § 363(f), courts would generally not exercise
their equitable powers pursuant to § 105 to extinguish liens in 363(b) Sales.
142. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2006).
143. In re Terrace Gardens, 96 B.R. at 712. In re WPRV-TV's reasoning that when special
circumstances exist making such a sale desirable, § 363(f)(3) is best read to permit the sale, is simi-
larly misguided. See 143 B.R. 315, 319 (D.P.R. 1991), vacated, 165 B.R. I (D.P.R. 1992), modified,




The strict textual approach advocated by this Note resolves the dis-
agreement as to whether § 363(f)(3) refers to the face value or the economic
value of the liens on the property. Properly understood, § 363(f)(3) does not
permit a 363(f) Sale of property securing an underwater lien, irrespective of
whether the face value approach or the economic value approach is the cor-
rect interpretation of "aggregative value of all liens."1 Courts adopting a
modified version of the economic value approach to permit 363(f) Sales of
property securing underwater liens ignore the plain language of the statute
by interpreting "greater than" to mean "equal to or greater than." In doing
so, courts adopting this approach cast aside Congress's will by effectively
writing § 363(f)(3) out of the Code and replacing it with their own discre-
tion. While it is true that Congress's narrow drafting of § 363(f)(3) might
allow-in fact, probably will allow-creditors to behave in imperfect ways,
and courts are more than capable of protecting creditors' rights in the ab-
sence of the Chapter 11 Safeguards, "policy reasons cannot defeat the plain
language of the statute." 45 The fact remains that Congress deliberately
placed § 363(f) into the Code.
Further, § 363(f)(3)'s narrow language is not as out of place in the Code
as its critics contend. Section 363(f) is an alternative to the standard Chapter
11 plan confirmation process. In a very narrow set of circumstances, it al-
lows debtors, at the debtor's option, to elect an express route to the effect of
plan confirmation, without the many Chapter 11 Safeguards to which they
would otherwise be subject. Because § 363(f)(3) operates in an entirely dif-
ferent context than the rest of Chapter 11, broad interpretations of provisions
in the latter are not necessarily analogous to the former.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
145. In re Canonigo, 276 B.R. 257, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
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